

# A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq

By

Lee B. Becker

James M. Cox Jr. Center for International Mass Communication Training and Research  
Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication  
University of Georgia  
Athens, GA 30602  
U.S.A.  
[lbbecker@uga.edu](mailto:lbbecker@uga.edu)

Presented to the conference on Public Opinion Polls and Decision Making: From Theory to Practice, February 6-8, 2007, Cairo. The author thanks Dr. Tudor Vlad, Dr. Ayman Nada and Joel McLean for their comments and assistance.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

A CBS News Poll in November of 1998 found that 88% of U.S. adults said Saddam Hussein would not “keep his promise to allow United Nations inspectors full access to look for weapons of mass destruction” (Survey by CBS News, November 16-17, 1998).

A Fox News Poll of registered voters the following month found that 51% thought the U.S. “should attempt to assassinate” Saddam (Survey by Fox News, December 17, 1998).

A Fox News Poll in October of 2001 (Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics, October 31-November 1, 2001) showed that 61% of registered voters said it was very or somewhat likely that Saddam “was involved in the recent anthrax attacks.”

*Time/CNN* found a month later (Survey by Time, Cable News Network and Harris Interactive, November 7-8, 2001) that 75% of the U.S. adults said it was very or somewhat likely that Saddam “was responsible for any of the recent incidents involving anthrax.”

It was not until January 29, 2002, in the State of the Union Address, that President George W. Bush began his campaign for war against Iraq. In that speech he made the following assertion (Bush, 2002):

“Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.”

These examples suggest that even before Bush and others in his administration began their campaign to win support for war against Iraq, large numbers of Americans did not trust Saddam Hussein and probably were suspicious of Iraq.

Many have said the media were too passive in covering the Bush campaign for war (Boehlert, 2006; Rich, 2006) . The critics have said the media allowed the administration to make false claims

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

about Iraq, leading to misperceptions on the part of the public about Saddam Hussein and Iraq (Kull, Ramsay and Lewis, 2003-04). These misperceptions, the critics have argued, led the public to support the Bush administration's call for, and ultimately launching of, the war.

If public opinion was so hostile to Saddam Hussein and Iraq even before the Bush administration launched its campaign to win support for the war, however, those assertions are open to challenge.

In this presentation I will examine public opinion about Iraq and about Saddam Hussein prior to the launch of the Bush administration information campaign, in order to understand the climate of opinion before the war began. I will use polling archives to conduct this analysis and make a few comments about what is possible with those archives.

I will present data which show that the Bush administration campaign and media coverage of it may well have reinforced initial negative views about Saddam Hussein and Iraq, but neither of these is likely to have altered public opinion in a dramatic way.

I will end with some tentative conclusions about what these findings mean for public support in the United States for the ongoing conflict in Iraq.

### **Criticism of the Media**

Criticism of the media for its coverage of the run-up to the war in Iraq and beyond is widespread. Kull, Ramsay and Lewis (2003-04) have presented a popular argument, namely that the media coverage resulted in misperceptions about Iraq and Saddam Hussein and that these misperceptions led to support for the war.

Rendall and Broughel (2003), in a three-week study of on-camera sources appearing in stories about Iraq on the evening television newscasts of ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox, and PBS just after the Iraq war began, found that official governmental voices dominated. A follow-up study of on-camera sources in stories on Iraq in October of 2003 by Whiten (2004) found that current government and military officers made up 72.1% of the sources.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Moeller (2004) found in an analysis of media coverage of the issue of weapons of mass destruction in 11 print and broadcast news outlets in May of 1998, October of 2002, and May of 2003 that coverage was simplistic, that the journalists largely accepted the Bush administration's position on WMDs, and that alternative point of view on the issue were lacking. Christie (2006), in a content analysis of *The New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and daily evening ABC-TV newscasts, found that the media in the two-months after the initiation of the war used roughly the same rationale for the war as did the Bush administration.

Boehlert (2006) has argued that the media have served not as a watchdog of the government but rather as a "mouthpiece" for the White House. Rich (2006), in his popular account, has chronicled the selling of the Iraq War by the Bush administration and the media's ineptitude in responding. Similar arguments were made by Rampton and Stauber (2003) and Massing (2004). Jamieson and Waldman (2003), in a more sympathetic account, have noted how difficult it is for journalists to tell political stories when public officials relay confusing versions of the facts.

### **Determinants of Iraqi Public Opinion**

The Kull, Ramsey and Lewis (2003-04) research on the determinants of public support for the war in Iraq has received much attention in both the scientific and popular press. As an example of the latter, it is used prominently in Robert Greenwald's film, "Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism."

Kull, Ramsey and Lewis have focused on misperceptions about Iraq and identified three that were prominent: that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction before the war, that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., and that world public opinion was supportive of the U.S. invasion. Kull, Ramsay and Lewis show that those who hold these misperceptions are more likely to support the war. They also showed evidence that Fox News viewers were most likely to have these misperceptions. The link between viewership of Fox News and the misperceptions held after a series of controls. In a logistic regression analysis, level of attention to news

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

was not a significant factor overall in predicting misperception, with the exception of those who primarily got their news from Fox.

A reanalysis of the Kull, Ramsey and Lewis data by Becker, McCutcheon and Vlad ( 2006), however, showed that the discrepancies between viewers of Fox and CBS News at the level of zero mistakes was quite small and statistically insignificant. The reanalysis showed that Fox News viewers were more likely than any other group to make the mistake of perceiving international public opinion as supportive of U.S. policy. Fox News and public broadcasting viewers and listeners were about equally confused about whether the U.S. actually found Weapons of Mass Destruction. Becker, McCutcheon and Vlad do not challenge the linkage between misperceptions and support for the war in Iraq, but argue that the relationship might not be causal. The misperceptions may be a rationale for support of the war, rather than a cause, they argue. The finding that those who have lower levels of knowledge are more supportive of the war was replicated by Merzer (2003) using different knowledge measures than those used by Kull, Ramsey and Lewis. Merzer also used a static design, so it is impossible to know if the misperceptions led to the support for the war or if they were a rationale developed after the decision to support the war.

Foyle (2004) analyzed trends in support for the U.S. going to war with Iraq from February of 2001 through March of 2003, when the U.S. actually invaded, and found little evidence of change in support that could be attributable to the administration's information campaign. In fact, support for such a war was actually lower in 2003 than in the months immediately after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on the U.S.

Western (2005) argued that the challenge facing the Bush administration in the period between the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the actual invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 was maintaining, not building, public support for the war. Western argued that Americans already were concerned about terrorism and about the possibility that unfriendly countries would obtain nuclear weapons. They also supported taking military action against Saddam Hussein. The Gallup Poll data Western cites show a decline in support of invasion of Iraq in the year after September 11 of 2001.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Following the all-out efforts of the Bush administration in the autumn of 2002, support did not go any lower and actually increased slightly in the early months of 2003, just before the war began.

Similarly, Everts and Isernia (2005), after a massive review of trends in U.S. polls on Iraq, found that, despite the efforts by the administration to lead the country to war, public opinion was not moved until shortly before the war began, when it was obvious that the invasion was going to take place. This was true despite the finding that the public largely accepted Bush's argument that Saddam Hussein was linked to the September 11 attacks on the U.S. and that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Everts and Isernia found that support for the use of force against Iraq ranged from 40% to 60% before the war, depending on how the question was asked. Questions that included a reference to Saddam Hussein produced higher levels of support.

Huddy , Khatib and Capelos (2002) found little evidence that even the 9-11 attacks on the U.S. had altered public support for going to war with Iraq. Sentiments in favor of war with Iraq already were high through the period of conflict between the two countries after the first Gulf War. Support for such action was actually lower in October of 2001 than it had been in February of 1999.

Mueller (2005) argues that declines in public support for the War in the U.S. after the invasion are largely a function of the number of casualties. While support for Iraq dropped more quickly than support for the wars in Vietnam and Korea, he attributes this to the weak case that was made for the war and the fact that the arguments turned out to be incorrect. In fact, according to Mueller, the continued support for the War in Iraq seems to be a function of the continued misperceptions about whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and Saddam was linked to the 9-11 terrorist attack. In Mueller's view, support for a war is a function of casualties, though the rate can be affected by other factors, such as the knowledge the voters have about the war.

Eichenberg (2005) presents a more complicated view, based on an analysis of survey questions on military interventions from 1980 through 2005, including the 2003 Iraqi War. He found that both the objective of the military mission and the outcome are important determinants of public support. Prior to

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

any conflict, Eicherberg found, support for using military force is always lower when the prospect of casualties is mentioned in the question. Support actually increases, however, when the intervention is successful, regardless of the level of casualties. Support decreases when the mission fails.

### **Unanswered Questions and Expectations**

These studies raise questions about the determinants of the U.S. public support for the 2003 War in Iraq both in the months leading up to that war and after the launching of the war by the United States in March of that year. Specifically, the studies leave unanswered questions about the effects of the George W. Bush administration's efforts to gain public support for a war and about the media's role in that effort. In fact, the studies challenge the assumption that the rationale for the war used in that campaign actually produced support for the war.

To some extent, the analysis of public opinion regarding the 2003 war in Iraq has been ahistorical, leaving out an understanding of how the American public has felt about Iraq over time. For this reason, the literature offers no guidance for understanding the level of support for military action against Iraq even before the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. In addition, the literature does not differentiate between public opinion about Iraq and public opinion regarding its leader, Saddam Hussein. And it gives no sense of how public opinion about Iraq compared with public opinion about other countries.

### **Data Archives**

To attempt to find answers to these questions, I immersed myself in polling data on Iraq and Saddam Hussein going back more than 50 years.

Tracking public opinion across time and the reanalysis and reinterpretation of findings has become much easier in recent years. A number of important archives have been created. In many cases, these archives hold not only reports of findings but also the raw data files, which often are made available for additional analyses.

The Roper Center at the University of Connecticut concentrates on national polls from the United States, though it does contain holdings from surveys in other countries (Roper Center, 2007). The

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

archive, called the iPOLL Databank, contains responses to nearly half a million questions from surveys conducted since 1935 and is updated on a daily basis. It also contains links to questionnaires and other documentation and, for approximately 60% of the questions, links to raw data files.

A search of the iPOLL Databank on January 11, 2007, found 11,205 questions in which the word "Iraq" appeared and 1,676 questions in which the words "Saddam Hussein" appeared. The first survey record for Iraq was in 1949; the first survey record for Saddam was in 1990.

Polling the Nations also contains responses to half a million questions from surveys from the United States and more than 100 other countries, going back to 1986 (Polling the Nations, 2007). More than 1,400 polling sources are included. The data base is updated monthly and includes details of fieldwork. A search of Polling the Nation on January 18, 2007, produced more than 1,000 questions from polls in the United States dealing with "Iraq" (the site does not provide a more precise figure) and more than 1,000 questions on "Saddam Hussein." In both cases, the first database records were for surveys in late 2002.

The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan also archives polling data as part of its massive social science data archive (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2007). ICPSR has holdings in political science, sociology and demography as well as thematic areas. A search of the ICPSR database on January 18, 2007, found 267 surveys containing "Iraq" and 97 containing "Saddam Hussein."

The Gallup Organization has created a searchable database of 70 years of its public opinion polls (Gallup Poll, 2007). Included are answers to more than 136,000 questions. The database also includes contains articles from the Gallup Poll News Service. Access to the Gallup archives is available on a subscription basis. On January 25, the archive contained 1,705 entries on "Iraq" and 283 on "Saddam Hussein." Many of the Gallup polls also are archived at the Roper Center.

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press also does extensive polling and makes its data files available for secondary analysis (Pew Research Center, 2007). The Center deposits its data at the Roper Center and does not maintain a searchable archive of questions, but it is possible to search



## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

the web site for reports. A search of the web site on January 18, 2007, found 884 reports on "Iraq" and 241 on "Saddam Hussein."

The Odum Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the University of North Carolina maintains a data archive of more than 230,000 questions and includes the polls of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. (Odum Institute for Research in Social Science). The archive contains more than 1,200 Harris Polls from as early as 1958 and contain more than 160,000 questions from those surveys. A search of the Harris files on January 18, 2007, produced 283 questions for "Iraq" and 82 items for "Saddam Hussein."

The magazine, *The Polling Report*, operates a web site, [PollingReport.com](http://PollingReport.com), which contains details of surveys on recent topics ([PollingReport.com](http://PollingReport.com), 2007b). The web site, which is publicly accessible and updated upon release of the findings from polls, in January of 2007 had extensive listings of polls on Iraq. A search of the site on January 18, 2007, found holdings back through November of 1998. The site is not searchable for individual items.

Since the amount of material available on Iraq in these databases was so extensive, I used the Roper Center database as a starting point, supplementing the data obtained there with data from the other sources. The Roper Center database, as noted, contains the earliest records on polls on Iraq. I also used the extensive listing of recent polls on Iraq in Everts and Isernia (2005) as a reference.

### **Early Opinions about Iraq**

The first mention of Iraq in the IPOLL Databank is for 1949, when the Roper organization asked a national sample of U.S. adults if they had heard of the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had a virtual monopoly on oil exploration in Iraq until 1961 and which included major American partners (Polk, 2005). Roper found that 59% of the public had not heard of IPC (Survey by Roper Organization, January 1949). In 1955, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago asked a national sample of U.S. adults if they approved of the U.S. joining Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and England in a mutual defense treaty against Russia, and 61% approved (Survey by National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, November 24-November 30, 1955).

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

By July of 1980, public opinion toward Iraq had developed and become negative. A survey by Louis Harris & Associates for the World Jewish Congress found that 56% of the population labeled Iraq as “not friendly but not an enemy” or “unfriendly and an enemy of the U.S.” (Survey by World Jewish Congress and Louis Harris & Associates, July 11-July 23, 1980). In September of 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, and a poll by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates (October 3-October 6, 1980) found that 39% of the population felt “more sympathy” for Iraq, while 11% felt “more sympathy” for Iran.

A survey by the Roper Organization (Survey by Roper Organization, July 11-July 18, 1981) following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June of 1981 found that 57% felt the Iraqi’s were planning to make nuclear bombs, as Israeli contended. Only 24%, however, said the bombing “was the right thing to do” and 39% said it was the “wrong thing to do.” Harris (2007a), in August of 1981, asked members of a U.S. national adult sample if they felt the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reaction was justified, and 38% said it was, while 51% said it was not.

Harris repeated its question on how “friendly” Iraq was to the U.S. in January of 1982 and found that those labeling the country as “not friendly but not an enemy” or “unfriendly and an enemy of the U.S.” had increased to 63% (Survey by Louis Harris & Associates, January 8-January 12, 1982).

U.S. policy toward Iraq shifted in February of 1982, when the country was taken off the list of state sponsors of terrorism (Jentleson, 1994). Yet a *Los Angeles Times* Poll (March 14-March 17, 1982) found that 37% of the U.S. population thought it possible that “Iraq would start a nuclear war,” while 45% said it would not. Harris found in a survey of “likely voters” in 1984 as the Iraq-Iran war wore on that 44% felt “more sympathetic” with Iraq, compared with 12% “more sympathetic” toward Iran (Survey by Louis Harris & Associates, June 7-June 11, 1984). At the end of 1986, however, the *Los Angeles Times* Poll found that only 19% of a national adult sample said they would like to see Iraq win the war, compared with 10% preferring Iran and 69% expressing no preference (Survey by *Los Angeles Times*, December 6-December 9, 1986).

In February of 1987, Harris repeated its question about Iraq’s relationship to the United States and found that 68% of the national sample labeled the country as either “not friendly” or “unfriendly and

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

an enemy” (Survey by Louis Harris & Associates, February 20-February 24, 1987). Roper, a few months later, found with a similarly worded question that 64% of the population felt that Iraq was “has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S. but not an enemy” or “has acted as an enemy of the U.S.” (Survey by Roper Organization, May 16-May 30, 1987).

In March of 1987 the U.S. became openly involved in the Iran-Iraq War when Iraq attacked the frigate USS Stark, killing 37 American sailors. Iraq apologized, saying the attack was an error. The U.S. began escorting Kuwaiti vessels through the Persian/Arabian Gulf (Jentleson, 1994) to protect them from Iranian attack. In a May poll, the *Los Angeles Times* found that 30% of the U.S. adult population wanted Iraq to win the war, compared with 5% favoring Iran (Survey by *Los Angeles Times*, May 28-June 1, 1987). In September of that year, a CBS/*New York Times* Poll (September 21-September 22, 1987) found that 43% of the national sample wanted Iraq to win, while 8% wanted Iran to win. The same poll found that only 7% of the population reported feeling “generally favorable” toward Iraq, while 44% were “generally unfavorable” and 41% were neutral. A Harris survey in August of 1987 (2007b) found that 51% of the U.S. population said that the U.S. policy of protecting “Kuwaiti oil tanking flying the American flag” would “guarantee that Iran would begin attacking American ships all over the Persian Gulf,” but 45% disagreed. The question informed respondents that Kuwait was an ally of Iraq in the Iran/Iraq war.

Chart 1 shows three questions by the *Los Angeles Times* on preferred winners of the Iran/Iraq war across its span. The first survey was of likely voters, but the following two were of the general U.S. adult population. While public support for Iran dropped during the period, support for Iraq actually declined from 1980 to 1986 before rebounding in 1987. In both 1986 and 1987, a clear majority of the respondents either expressed no preference or didn’t know what preference they had. In July of 1988, the Iraq-Iran War was ended via a U.N. sponsored ceasefire.

A survey by the American Jewish Congress in April of 1988 repeated the Harris question on the public’s view of Iraq and found that 57% of a national adult sample thought that Iraq was “not friendly” or “unfriendly and an enemy of the U.S.,” down from 68% a year earlier (Survey by American Jewish

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Congress and Marttila & Kiley, April 18-April 24, 1988). The responses to these questions are summarized over time in Chart 2. In July of 1980, Iraq was viewed as either “not friendly” or “an enemy” by 56% of the U.S. population. That figure increased to 67% early in the Iran/Iraq war but then began to decline, ending at 57% before the war ended. The percentage of respondents without an opinion also dropped from 29% to 12%.

A question on a survey by the Roper Organization, summarized in Chart 3, gives a picture of the relative standing of Iraq in U.S. public opinion near the end of the Iran/Iraq war, in May of 1987. Iran was viewed as “an enemy” by 52% of the population, ahead of the Soviet Union, viewed as an enemy by 33% of the population. Iraq was viewed as an enemy by a nearly identical 30% of the population. No other country comes close to these three countries in this view.

On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. As Chart 2 shows, the response in terms of U.S. public opinion was dramatic. Immediately after the invasion, 87% of the U.S. adult population said Iraq was either “not friendly” to the U.S. or “an enemy” of the U.S. That total figure was basically unchanged in January of 1991, but the percentage of people viewing Iraq as “an enemy” actually increased sharply during that period.

A survey by Gallup for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in October and November of 1990, placed Iraq at the bottom of a list of 23 countries in terms of feelings in the U.S. Chart 4 summarizes the responses to a question asking respondents to use a 100 point “feeling thermometer” on which 50 was neutral, scores above 50 were warm, and scores below 50 were cold. Iraq received a mean score of 20. Iran was next lowest with a mean score of 27. No other country was close.

U.S. public opinion seemed to support some sort of U.S. immediate response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but support varied quite a bit based on the type of response proposed. A Gallup poll immediately after the invasion found that only 23% favored “direct U.S. military action against Iraq at this time,” though that figure jumped to 60% if “Iraq invades Saudi Arabia in addition to Kuwait” (Survey by Gallup Organization, August 3-August 4, 1990). A CBS News Poll a few days later (August 7-August 8, 1990) found only 23% support for a U.S. bombing raid on Iraq but 49% support for “using U.S. troops to

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.” An ABC News/*Washington Post* Poll at the same time (August 8, 1990) found that 66% said that the “United States should take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait,” but only 38% said they favored “invading Kuwait to force out Iraq, even it is means risking war with Iraq.” An Associated Press survey (August 8-August 12, 1990) found 35% of the population said the U.S. should use ground troops “to push Iraq out of Kuwait” and 27% said the U.S. should “bomb Iraqi military targets to force Iraq out of Kuwait.”

A Time Cable News Network poll (August 9, 1990) found that 53% favored “military action to force Iraq to remove its troops from Kuwait,” 38% favored “bombing Iraqi military installations in Iraq” and 31% favored “bombing Iraqi military installations in Kuwait.” An ABC News Poll (August 17-August 20, 1990) found that 76% of the national adult sample agreed that the United States “should take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait,” and 45% favored “invading Kuwait to force out Iraq, even it is meant risking war with Iraq.”

In early January of 1991, after the United Nations Security Council had set January 15 as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, opinion about appropriate U.S. action had solidified. An ABC News/*Washington Post* Poll (January 4-January 8, 1991) found that 69% said the U.S. “should take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait.” A survey on January 16, 1991, by the same organization, the day after the U.S. went to war with Iraq, found that 76% of the population approved of the action (ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 16, 1991). A *USA Today* Poll on that same date (Survey by *USA Today* and Gordon S. Black Corporation, January 16, 1991) showed that 75% of the adult sample favored President George H. W. Bush’s decision to attack Iraq. A CBS News/*New York Times* Poll (January 17, 1991) poll the following day found that 79% of the population said the U.S. “did the right thing in starting military action against Iraq.

Iraq capitulated on February 27, 1991, and President Bush ordered a ceasefire. A *Washington Post* Poll (March 1-March 5, 1991) a few days later found that 82% of the population approved of the

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

United States having gone to war. A *Time*, Cable News Network Poll (March 7, 1991) showed that 77% of the population said that “winning the war with Iraq has been worth the costs.

But satisfaction with the 1991 War in Iraq was short lived. In April, 35% of the population said that the U.S. should have “fought longer” (Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 10-11, 1991). A month later, 54% of the population said the United States ended the “war with Iraq too soon” (Survey by NBC News, *Wall Street Journal* and Hart and Teeter Research, May 10-May 14, 1991).

### **Early Opinions about Saddam Hussein**

Though Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq on July 16, 1979 (Jentleson, 1994), his name did not appear in the Roper databank until August of 1990, just after he invaded Kuwait. Saddam Hussein, however, was either already well known to the U.S. population or quickly became known. By the end of November of 1990, four months after the invasion, Gallup (Survey by Gallup Organization, November 29-December 2, 1990) found that 75% of its respondents could correctly “name the leader of Iraq.” *The Washington Post* Poll (November 40-December 4, 1990) found that 81% could correctly say who Saddam Hussein was.

The U.S. population viewed Saddam Hussein very negatively. A CBS News Poll (August 7-August 8, 1990) showed that 36% of the U.S. adult population favored a U.S. “attempt to overthrow the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.” An ABC News/*Washington Post* Poll (August 8, 1990) found that 42% of the adult population approved of “doing whatever is necessary to topple the Iraqi government, even it means assassinating Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.” That same poll asked if President George H. W. Bush’s comparison of Saddam Hussein to Hitler was a “fair comparison,” and 45% agreed that it was. A *Newsweek*/Gallup Poll (August 9-August 10, 1990) found that 34% of the respondents supported a plan to covertly assassinate Saddam Hussein “as a way of quickly ending the current Middle East crisis.” Two weeks later these same pollsters found that 73% of the population felt “removing Saddam Hussein’s government from power in Iraq” should be “among the goals of the U.S. forces” (Survey by *Newsweek* and Gallup, August 23-August 24, 1990). A *Time*, Cable News Network Poll showed that

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

47% of the population at that same time (August 23, 1990) said the U.S. should “take extreme actions—such as assassination—to remove Saddam Hussein from power.”

A little more than two months later, The Gallup Poll (November 8-November 11, 1990) found that 70% of the adult sample would support the use of military force to topple “Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.” A Harris Poll (November 9-November 13, 1990) found that 70% of the population favored “engineering a coup in Iraq which would either overthrow Saddam Hussein or kill him and his closest advisors.”

In October of 1994, a Gallup survey for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that Saddam Hussein was very negatively evaluated by the U.S. population, even in comparison with other controversial figures (Chart 5). Saddam Hussein had an average score of only 11 on the 100-point thermometer feeling scale. Even Cuban President Fidel Castro did better, with a score of 20. Four years later, the same question, used on another survey for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, showed that Saddam Hussein score was basically unchanged, at 12 (Chart 6). Only Castro came close, with a score of 23. Even Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic scored 33 on the scale. Another Gallup survey that same year found that Saddam Hussein had a 96% unfavorable rating (Chart 7). Only 3% of the people had no opinion on Saddam. Only Pope John Paul II, who enjoyed an 86% favorable rating, had so few people unable or unwilling to offer an opinion.

### **Public Opinion in the Run-Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq**

In the decade after the first Gulf War, Iraq has had a largely negative image with the U.S. population. Chart 8 tracks a measure of how favorable people felt from just after the start of the first Gulf war in late January of 1991 through February of 2001 and shows that while the intensity of negative feelings moderated somewhat, the total percentage of respondents with an unfavorable evaluation remained remarkably constant. In January of 1991, 90% of the population had a “Very unfavorable” or “Mostly unfavorable” evaluation of Iraq. In February of 2001, that figure was 85%. In the year after the September 11 attacks, that figure changed only slightly, to 88%, and it moved to 90% again just before the invasion in March of 2003. In fact, there was little room for movement, as Iraq’s image was extremely

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

negative through the period. The Bush campaign against Iraq may have changed the intensity of the negative feeling, but the negative feeling itself was already present before the campaign was launched.

Charts 9 and 10 show this finding in a comparative context. In late 1998, a Council on Foreign Relations survey (summarized in Chart 9) showed Iraq to be the most negatively evaluated country on a list of 24. This is the same thermometer rating used in 1990 and shown in Chart 4. Iraq didn't move appreciably during that period, and it remained the lowest rated country—slightly below Iran and considerably below North Korea and Cuba. Four years later—in June of 2002—the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that Iraq's average thermometer score was again unchanged, but again it was below all other countries, including Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea and Cuba (Chart 10).

Similarly, Saddam Hussein's image was extremely negative in the period before the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. A survey in March of 2002 found that 96% of the U.S. population said they had an unfavorable opinion of Saddam Hussein (Chart 11). The figure for Osama Bin Laden was comparable. There was little room for either to go higher. The 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey found Saddam Hussein had a thermometer rating of 8.3 (Chart 12). No other world leader, including Cuban President Fidel Castro, was even close to Saddam Hussein in terms of negative assessment. Saddam Hussein's thermometer rating was not appreciably different in 1998 (Chart 6), again because there isn't much lower his score can go. All three of these surveys found very few people who did not know—and have an opinion—of Saddam Hussein.

The finding in the Fox News Poll in December of 1998 that 51% of registered voters in the U.S. thought the U.S. "should attempt to assassinate" Saddam (Survey by Fox News, December 17, 1998) was not an aberration. Chart 13 shows that support for such a harsh position was found in two other Fox Polls of registered voters, in November of 2001 and June of 2002. The figure actually did not seem to be affected by the terrorist attack of 2001 and declined just before the war began in March of 2003.

Support for taking military action against Saddam similarly built to and remained at very high levels in the years after the end of the first Gulf War. Chart 14 shows responses to a simple question about support for military action against Saddam Hussein. Respondents were asked if they supported or



## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

opposed the use of military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The figure never dropped below 56% from April of 1991 to February of 1999. In fact, after October of 1994, the ratio was mostly between two-thirds and three-quarters of the population.

To a considerable extent, the desire to remove Saddam Hussein from power shown in Chart 14 seems to be a reflection of the belief on the part of many Americans that the United States made a mistake by ending the first Gulf War before Saddam was removed from office. Charts 15 and 16 show the responses to similarly worded questions used in two different sets of polls, the first by Gallup and the second by CBS News and *The New York Times*, in the decade after the first Gulf War. In February of 1991, before the end of the war, both the Gallup Organization (Chart 15) and CBS/*New York Times* found that 46% of the population felt the U.S. should continue fighting until Saddam Hussein is removed from power. That sentiment continued to grow in both polls in the next several months and remained stable until at least February of 1998. It seems clear that about three-quarters of the population had come to feel that the war had ended too soon because Saddam has not been removed from office.

According to the CBS Poll (Chart 16), the belief that the 1991 Gulf War should have continued until Saddam Hussein was removed from office actually dropped by about 10 percentage points in the months before the September 11, 2001, attacks. In addition, a question on a *Washington Post* survey, presented in Chart 17, indicates that American attention was diverted at least in a comparative sense from Saddam and Iraq by those attacks. The poll found that 96% of the U.S. population in late September of 2001 felt that the U.S. must capture or kill Osama Bin Laden or that it was at least a good idea to do that. The same poll found that 82% said the U.S. must overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan or that it was at least a good idea to do so. And 72% said it was necessary or a good idea to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Gallup Poll in November of 2001 found that a nearly identical figure—74%—said they would favor invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Chart 18).

The data in Chart 18, which tracks the Gallup question on sending troops back to Iraq, suggests that the post 9-11 increase in a desire to send troops back to Iraq did not hold. In the months from

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

August of 2002 through January of 2003, between 53% and 61% of the respondents to the Gallup Poll supported invading Iraq again, with more surveys close to the 53% figure than the 61% figure. Only in early 2003, as the Bush administration moved troops into place for what then seemed to be an inevitable war, did public opinion rally slightly in favor of the pending invasion.

The Bush Administration's verbal campaign against Iraq began in the State of the Union address in January of 2002 (Western, 2005). During the next months, President Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney and the chief cabinet officers kept up the attack on both Saddam Hussein and Iraq. In October, both houses of Congress passed resolutions authorizing the president to use force in Iraq. On November 8, 2002, the United Nation Security Council, at the urging of the U.S., adopted Resolution 1441, proclaiming Iraq in breach of its disarmament obligations. A summary of these statements is shown in the Appendix.

Despite these efforts on the part of the Bush administration to make the case for the war in Iraq, public support for invading Iraq with ground troops—which is what Bush was proposing—remained largely unchanged. The conclusion from an examination of the responses on this single item is that somewhere around 57% of the U.S. population, plus or minus about 4%, favored invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power prior to the actual build-up to bring that invasion to reality.

The Gallup question is an appropriate one, for, in the end, this has become the rationale for the U.S. invasion. Since there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and the attacks on the U.S. and Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, the rationale for the attack has focused on Saddam's removal. Clearly a majority of the American people supported that course of action, though the majority was not overwhelming. Public opinion had become quite hostile to Iraq and Saddam Hussein in particular, but support for the war in the years before the invasion actually was lower than it had been at the end of the previous decade.

Clearly the public did accept many of the assertions and innuendos of the Bush campaign (Becker, McCutcheon and Vlad, 2006). A Knight Ridder Poll in January of 2003 (PollingReport.com, 2007a) found that 21% of those sampled thought that "most" of the September 11 terrorist hijackers were

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Iraqi citizens, 23% said “some” were Iraqi, and 6% said “just one” was an Iraqi citizen. In fact, none were, though only 17% of the population gave that answer (Malkin, 2002). Support for the war did not seem to be influenced by the campaign.

### **Public Opinion After the Invasion**

Once the U.S. invasion of Iraq had begun on March 19, 2003, the U.S. public became more supportive of the war. Based on Gallup’s gross measure of support, which it has used across different wars, about 70% of the U.S. population for the first two months said it favored the war (Chart 19). Gallup did not use the question from late April of 2003 until late October of that year, and during that time period support for the war had declined markedly. A year later, the percentage of those supporting the war and the percentage opposing the war had become equal. By June of 2005, about 60% of the population was opposed to the war. The most recent poll by Gallup using this question, in January of this year, showed 61% of the population opposed to the war and 36% in favor.

Gallup more frequently has asked respondents if they think it was worth going to war in Iraq. In fact, Gallup asked this question even before the war began, and the percentage, in January of 2003, saying it was worth going to war was 53%. The figure is nearly identical to the one obtained in response to the question used in Chart 18, and the figures in March of 2003 also are nearly identical for the two questions. For this reason, it make some sense to treat Chart 20 as the logical extension of Chart 18.

Chart 20 also shows increases in support for the war in Iraq immediately after the invasion, followed by rather dramatic declines in support even in late April, as is in evidence in Chart 19 as well. In late 2004, the percentage of respondents thinking it was worth going to war and the percentage thinking it was not worth going to war were nearly the same, and the figures have diverged since then, so that in the most recent poll in early December of 2006 the percentages opposed to the war are nearly the same in Chart 20 as in Chart 19. About 60% of the population is opposed to the war; about 35% is in favor of it.

Another Gallup question asks respondents to reflect, “in view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Iraq,” whether the decision was a mistake or not. Chart 21 shows this trend, and it is

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

nearly the same as the others. By January of this year, 60% said it was a mistake, and 40% said it was not.

Americans do not believe the war is going well, as reflected in Chart 22. About 30% in the most recent poll in January said the war is going well, and 70% said it is not. Only 16% in the January poll said the U.S. is winning the war (Chart 23). More than half of the population wants to withdraw troops either immediately or in 12 months (Chart 24). About 70% of the population does not think George Bush has a plan for what to do in Iraq (Chart 25).

President Bush gave his televised address to the nation on January 10, 2007, and announced a revised policy for Iraq including plans to send additional troops. As Charts 21 and 24 indicate, the announcement had no impact on public views about the war. The speech may have led slightly more citizens to think Bush actually had a plan for Iraq (Chart 25).

### **Concluding Comments**

Quite clearly, American public opinion in the years running up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. was negative toward Iraq and particularly toward its president, Saddam Hussein. Large percentages of Americans saw Iraq in a negative light, despite the fact that the U.S. had been an ally of Iraq during its war with Iran. Americans also viewed Saddam Hussein very negatively, and public opinion became even more negative after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, despite the U.S. culpability in that decision (Jentleson, 1994).

In many ways, Iraq was an easy target for the Bush administration when it took office. It seems almost certain Bush and his neoconservative advisers knew the poll data and knew how receptive public opinion was to taking action against Iraq. By all indications, this is a clear example of the use of public opinion data in decision-making—the theme of this paper and this conference.

It is impossible to know how confrontational the Bush administration would have been against Iraq had the U.S. not experienced terrorist attacks on September 11 of 2001. There is some suggestion (Chart 17) that these attacks distracted the American public from Iraq, though the data shown in Chart

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

16 suggest that the weakening of support for an attack on Iraq might have begun even before September 11, 2001.

Under any circumstance, by the time the Bush administration launched its verbal campaign against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, large segments of the public remained receptive to them.

The Bush administration's campaign, at best, kept public opinion from moving further away from support of military action against Iraq. It appears that somewhere around 57% of the U.S. population, plus or minus about 4%, favored invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power prior to the movement of troops into the theater in early 2003.

Clearly, support for the military action once it took place was short lived. The data examined here show that strong support lasted only a couple of months. Within a year of the invasion, opinion was shifting clearly in the negative direction.

Two periods are particularly informative in the post-war months. The first is late December of 2003, when Saddam Hussein was captured. Chart 20 shows a clear increase in public support for the war in the polls immediately following this event. Chart 21 shows a slight increase in support for the war in the period surrounding Saddam Hussein's conviction, on November 5, 2006. It may well be that the personalization of the war as a battle against Saddam Hussein has contributed to the softness of the support. Without Saddam as an enemy, support seems likely to continue its decline.

In this review I have been selective in my examination of poll data. The amount of material is very great. No doubt, there are many questions that this presentation and others raise that require further analyses of those data.

The good news is that the data are now much more readily available for secondary analysis than was true in the past. Because many of the raw data files are accessible, it will be possible to do more than simply look at the trends, which is mostly what I have done here.

Simple as this analysis is, however, it provides at last partial answers to the questions raised at the outset. The data run counter to the popular claim that the Bush administration, through its campaign

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

for war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, moved public opinion dramatically in that direction. There is little evidence that such movement of public opinion took place.

In the eyes of some, this finding may remove some of the blame placed on the media for their rather passive coverage of the Bush assertions. Clearly the public had negative views of Saddam and of Iraq even before the campaign began. But that negative view came from somewhere, and it does not reflect the complexity of relationships in international affairs. The media certainly deserve some of the blame for the hostile and overly simplistic view the public held of both Iraq and Saddam Hussein before the current war began. Vilification of a country and even a despotic leader probably should not be a goal of media coverage.

The media also are obligated to give its citizens a sense of public opinion and its relationship to public policy. The media in the United States certainly did present the findings of the many polls, but I do not believe they presented the systematic analyses of the long-term trends in those polls that is now possible. The media need to take advantage of the new opportunities for secondary analyses as well.

## A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq

### References

Becker, L. B., McCutcheon, A., & Vlad, T., (2006). "Who really thinks Saddam was personally involved? Examining changes in misperceptions about the Iraq War, paper presented to the Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research, Chicago, 2006.

Boehlert, E. (2006). *Lapdogs: How the press rolled over for Bush*. New York: Free Press.

Bush, G.W. (2002, January 29). State of the Union Address. Retrieved January 23, 2007, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

Christie, T. B., (2006). Framing rationale for the Iraq war; The interaction of public support with mass media and public policy agendas. *The International Communication Gazette*, 68(5–6): 519-532.

Eicherberg, R.C. (2005). Victory has many friends :U.S. public opinion and the use of military force,1981–2005. *International Security*, 30 (1 ): 140–77.

Everts, P., & Isernia, P. (2005). The polls-trends: The war in Iraq. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 69 (2): 264-323.

Foyle, D.C. (2004). Leading the public to war: The influence of American Public Opinion on the Bush administration's decision to go to war in Iraq. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 16 (3): 269-94.

Gallup Poll (2007a). *Gallup Brain*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from <http://brain.gallup.com/>.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Gallup Poll (2007b). *Gallup's pulse on democracy: The war in Iraq*. Retrieved 1/29/07 from <http://www.galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1633>.

Harris, Louis, & Assoc. Polls (2007a). *Question detail*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from <http://cgi.irss.unc.edu>.

Harris, Louis, & Assoc. Polls (2007b). *Question detail*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from <http://cgi.irss.unc.edu>.

Harris, Louis, & Assoc. Polls (2007). *Question detail*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from <http://cgi.irss.unc.edu>.

Huddy, L. , Khatib, N. & Capelos, T (2002). The polls—trends: Reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66:418–50.

Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (2007). *About ICPSR*. Retrieved 1/25/2007 from <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/org/index.html>.

Jamieson, K. H., & Waldman, P. (2003). *The press effect: Politicians, journalists and the stories that shape the political world*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jentleson, B. W. (1994). *With friends like these: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982-1990*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Kull, S., Ramsay, C., & Lewis, E. (2003-04). Misperceptions, the media, and the Iraq War. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118 (4): 569-98.

Malkin, M. (2002). *Invasion: How America still welcomes terrorists, criminals, and other foreign menaces to our shores*. Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.



## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Massing, M. (2004). *Now they tell us: The American press and Iraq*. New York: New York Review of Books.

Merzer, M. (2003). *Poll: Majority of Americans oppose unilateral action against Iraq*. Originally published in *The Miami Herald* on Jan. 12, 2003. Retrieved 1/23/2007 from [www.lossless-audio.com/usa/1500376154.htm](http://www.lossless-audio.com/usa/1500376154.htm).

Moeller, S. D. (2004). *Media coverage of weapons of mass destruction*. Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland. Retrieved 5/25/2006 from [http://www.pipa.org/articles/WMDstudy\\_full.pdf](http://www.pipa.org/articles/WMDstudy_full.pdf).

Mueller, J. (2005). The Iraq syndrome. *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (6): 44-54.

Odum Institute for Research in Social Science (2007). *Public opinion poll question database*. Retrieved 1/25/2007 from [http://www.irss.unc.edu/odum/jsp/content\\_node.jsp?nodeid=140](http://www.irss.unc.edu/odum/jsp/content_node.jsp?nodeid=140).

Polk, W. R. (2005). *Understanding Iraq*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.

PollingReport.com (2007a). *Iraq (11)*. Retrieved 1/23/2007 from <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq11.htm>.

PollingReport.com (2007b). *Public opinion online*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from <http://www.pollingreport.com/>.

Polling the Nations (2007). *Frequently asked questions*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from <http://www.orspub.com/page16.html>.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Pew Research Center (2007). *Survey Reports*. Retrieved 1/25/2007 from <http://people-press.org/reports/>.

Rampton, S., and Stauger, J. (2003). *Weapons of mass deception*. New York: Penquin Group.

Rendall, S., & Broughel, T. Amplifying officials, squelching dissent: FAIR study finds democracy poorly served by war coverage. *Extra! (May/June 2003)*. Retrieved 11/7/06 from [www.fair.org/extra/0305/warstudy.html](http://www.fair.org/extra/0305/warstudy.html).

Rich, F. (2006). *The greatest story ever sold: The decline and fall of trust from 9/11 to Katrina*. New York: The Penguin Press.

Roper Center (2007). *iPoll databank and Polling the Nations*. Retrieved 1/18/2007 from [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data\\_access/ipoll/ipoll\\_comp\\_pollnat.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll_comp_pollnat.html).

Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates (October 3-October 6, 1980). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post* (August 8, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post* (January 4-January 8, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post* (January 16, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by American Jewish Congress and Marttila & Kiley (April 18-April 24, 1988). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of

Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by American Viewpoint (March 6-March 11, 2002). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Associated Press (August 8-August 14, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Cable News Network, *USA Today* and Gallup Organization (February 24, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University

of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Cable News Network, *USA Today* and Gallup Organization (October 11, 1994). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University

of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by Cable News Network, *USA Today* and Gallup Organization (November 21-November 23, 1997). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by CBS News (August 7-August 8, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by CBS News (October 16-October 18, 1994). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by CBS News (September 16-September 18, 1996). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by CBS News (November 23-November 24, 1997). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by CBS News (February 10-February 12, 2001). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (September 21-September 22, 1987). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (January 17, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (February 12-February 13, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (May 7-May 8, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (June 3-June 6, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (March 26-March 29, 1992). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (June 17-June 20, 1992). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (August 11-August 14, 1992). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by CBS/*New York Times* Poll (February 19-February 21, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (October 23-November 15, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (October 7-October 25, 1994). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (October 15-November 10, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, German Marshall Fund and Harris Interactive (June 1-June 30, 2002). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News (December 17, 1998). Retrieved 5/25/2006 from [www.pollingreport.com/iraq11htm](http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq11htm).

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (November 12-November 13, 1997). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (November 11-November 12, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (December 17, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (February 21-22, 2001). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (October 31-November 1, 2001). Retrieved 10/06/2006 from <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (November 28-November 29, 2001). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (June 18-June 19, 2002). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (February 25-February 26, 2003). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (August 3-August 4, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (November 8-November 11, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (November 29-December 2, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.



### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by Gallup Organization (February 7-February 10, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (April 4-April 6, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (July 19-July 21, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (December 29-29, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Gallup Organization (February 19-February 21, 1999). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Louis Harris & Associates (January 8-January 12, 1982). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by Louis Harris & Associates (June 7-June 11, 1984). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Louis Harris & Associates (February 20-February 24, 1987). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Louis Harris & Associates (August 17-August 21, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Louis Harris & Associates (November 9-November 13, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by Louis Harris & Associates (January 24-January 26, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by *Los Angeles Times* (October 5-October 9, 1980). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by *Los Angeles Times* (March 14-March 17, 1982) . Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by *Los Angeles Times* (December 6-December 9, 1986). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by *Los Angeles Times* (May 28-June 1, 1987). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, November 24-November 30, 1955. Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by NBC News, *Wall Street Journal* and Hart and Teeter Research (May 10-May 14, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

Survey by *Newsweek* and Gallup Organization (August 9-August 10, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by *Newsweek* and Gallup Organization (August 23-August 24, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Roper Organization (January 1949). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Roper Organization (July 11-July 18, 1981). Retrieved January 16, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by Roper Organization (May 16-May 30, 1987). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman (August 9, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman (August 23, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman (March 7, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman (April 10-11, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman (August 19-August 20, 1992). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Partners (October 11-October 12, 1994). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Partners (September 4-September 5, 1996). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Partners (February 4-February 5, 1998). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

### **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Survey by *Time*, Cable News Network and Yankelovich Partners (December 17-December 18, 1998).

Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *USA Today* and Gordon S. Black Corporation (January 16, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Washington Post* (November 30-December 4, 1990). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Washington Post* (March 1-March 5, 1991). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by *Washington Post* (September 25-September 27, 2001). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Survey by World Jewish Congress and Louis Harris & Associates, July 11-July 23, 1980). Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <<http://ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>>.

Western, J. (2005). The war over Iraq: Selling war to the American public. *Security Studies*, 14 (1): 106-39.


## **A Secondary Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls about the War in Iraq**

Whiten, J. (2004). If news from Iraq is bad, it's coming from U.S. officials. *Extra1 (February 2004)*.

Retrieved 11/07/06 from <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2840>.

# Chart 1: Preferred Winner of Iran-Iraq War

If you have a preference, which side would you like to see win the Iran-Iraq War?




Source: Surveys by Los Angeles Times (Oct. 1980; Dec. 1986. May 1987) (Note: 1980 was likely voter sample).



## Chart 2: Perceptions about Iraq's Relationship to U.S.


Q. I'm going to read you the names of some countries. For each country, tell me if you feel that country is a close ally of the U.S., is friendly, but not a close ally, is not friendly but not an enemy, or is unfriendly and an enemy of the U.S.?



Source: Harris (2007c) for July 1980, Nov. 1981, Jan. 1982, Feb. 1987; Survey by American Jewish Congress (Apr. 1988); Survey by Louis Harris & Associates, Aug. 1990, Jan. 1991).

# Chart 3: Impressions about Relationships between Other Countries and U.S.


Q. I'd like to have your impressions about the overall position that some countries have taken toward the U.S. Would you read down the list, and for each country, tell me if you believe that country has acted as a close ally of the U.S., Has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the U.S., Has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S. But not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the U.S.?



Source: Survey for Roper Organization (May 1987). N=1,998 personal interviews; split sample for all but first two items.

## Chart 4: Thermometer Ratings of Countries


Q. I'd like you to rate these countries on this feeling thermometer. If you feel neutral toward a country, give it a temperature of 50 degrees. If you have warm feeling toward a country, give it a temperature higher than 50. If you have a cool feeling toward a country, give it a temperature lower than 50 degrees.



Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (Oct.-Nov. 1990) (N=829).

# Chart 5: Thermometer Ratings of Leaders 1994


Q. Now I would like you to rate some American and foreign leaders on this thermometer scale. Neutral = 50 degrees; warm = higher than 50 degrees, cool = lower than 50 degrees.



Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (Oct. 1994) (N=1492).

## Chart 6: Thermometer Ratings Leaders 1998


Q. Now I would like you to rate some American and foreign leaders on this thermometer scale. If you feel neutral toward a leader, give it a temperature of 50 degrees. If you have a warm feeling toward a leader, give it a temperature higher than 50 degrees. If you have a cool feeling toward a leader, give it a temperature lower than 50 degrees.



Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (Oct.-Nov. 1998) (N=1507).

# Chart 7. Opinions of Foreign Leaders in the News 1998


Q. Now I'm going to read the names of some foreign leaders who were in the news this year. As I read each name, please say if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of this person--or if you have never heard of him or her.



Survey by Gallup Organization (Dec. 1998) (N=1055).

# Chart 8: Views of Iraq


Q. Next, I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. First, is your overall opinion of Iraq, very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?



^ Asked of a half sample. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 9: Thermometer Ratings of Countries 1998

Q. Now I would like you to rate these countries on this thermometer scale. If you feel neutral toward a leader, give it a temperature of 50 degrees. If you have a warm feeling toward a leader, give it a temperature higher than 50 degrees. If you have a cool feeling toward a leader, give it a temperature lower than 50 degrees.




Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Gallup Organization (Oct.-Nov. 1998) (N=1507).



# Chart 10: Thermometer Ratings of Countries 2002


Q. I'd like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that country. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country, please say so.



Source: Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, et al. (June, 2002) (N=1099 for Italy to China; N=737 for Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan).

# Chart 11: Ratings of People and Organizations in Politics 2002


Q. Now I am going to read you the names of several people or organizations that are active in politics today and have you tell me if you have a favorable, unfavorable opinion of that person or organization.



Source: Survey by American Viewpoint (March 2002) (N=800).

## Chart 12: Thermometer Ratings of Leaders 2002


Q. I'd like you to rate your feelings toward some American and foreign leaders, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that leader. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that leader, please say so.



Source: Survey by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, et al. (June 2002) (N=709).

# Chart 13: Support for Assassination of Saddam Hussein


Q: Do you think the United States should attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein? (Registered voters)



Source: Surveys by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics (Nov. 1997, Nov. 1998, Dec. 1998, Feb. 2001, Nov. 2001, June 2002, Feb. 2003).

# Chart 14: Support for Using Military To Remove Saddam Hussein


Do you favor or oppose using military force now to remove Saddam Hussein from power?



Source: Survey by Time, et al. (Apr. 1991, Aug. 1992, Oct. 1994, Sept. 1996, Feb. 1998, Dec. 1998); Cable News Network, et al. (Feb. 1998); Survey by Gallup (Feb. 1999).

# Chart 15: Support for Continuing First Gulf War to Remove Saddam (Gallup)


Q. Do you feel the United States and its allies should have continued fighting until Saddam Hussein was removed from power, or not?



Source: Surveys by Gallup (Feb, 1991, April 1991, July 1991); Surveys by Cable News Network, et al. (Oct. 1994, Nov. 1997).

# Chart 16: Support for Continuing First Gulf War to Remove Saddam (CBS/NYT)


Q. What do you think the United States should do (should have done)? Should the United States stop (have stopped) fighting when Iraqi troops leave (left) Kuwait, or should the U.S. Continue (have continued) fighting until Saddam Hussein is (was) removed from power?



Source: Surveys by CBS (Oct. 1994, Sept. 1996, Nov. 1997, Feb. 2001); Surveys by CBS/New York Times (Feb. 1991, May 1991, June 1991, March 1992, June 1992, Aug. 1992, Feb. 1998).

## Chart 17: Things U.S. Must Do After 9-11 Attacks

Q. I am going to read you a list of things some people say the United States must do in its war on international terrorism, but others say are a lower priority. For each, please tell me if this is something you think the United States absolutely must do, no matter what, something that would be good to do, but not essential, something that is a lower priority, or something that should not be done at all.




Source: Survey by Washington Post (Sept. 2001) (N=1215).



# Chart 18: Favor Invading Iraq to Remove Saddam Hussein


Q. Would you favor or oppose invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power?



^ Asked of half sample. & WORDING: Turning to the situation in Iraq, would you favor or oppose the United States taking all military action necessary, including the use of American combat troops, to force Saddam Hussein from power? + WORDING: Would you favor or oppose sending American ground troops to the Persian Gulf in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq? \* WORDING: Would you favor or oppose sending American troops back to the Persian Gulf in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq? # Life Magazine/Gallup. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 19: Support for War in Iraq: Either-Or Question


Q. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war with Iraq?



^ Asked of a half sample. + Polls conducted entirely in one day, such as this one, are subject to additional error or bias not found in polls conducted over several days. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 20: Support for Going to War in Iraq


Q. All in all, do you think it was worth going to war in Iraq, or not?



^ Asked of a half sample. + WORDING: All in all, do you think the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over, or not? \* WORDING: All in all, do you think the current situation in Iraq is worth going to war over, or not? # Polls conducted entirely in one day, such as this one, are subject to additional error or bias not found in polls conducted over several days. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 21: Iraq War a Mistake


Q. In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not?



^ Asked of a half sample. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 22: How Well War Going


Q. In general, how would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq—[ROTATED: very well, moderately well, moderately badly, (or) very badly]?



^ WORDING: How would you say things are going for the U.S. in Iraq now that the major fighting has ended [ROTATED: very well, moderately well, moderately badly, (or) very badly]? + Asked of a half sample. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 23: Perceived Current Winner of War in Iraq


Q. Who do you think is currently winning the war in Iraq -- the U.S. and its allies, the insurgents in Iraq, or neither side?



^Asked of a half sample. Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

## Chart 24. Support for Immediate Withdrawal from Iraq


Q. Here are four different plans the U.S. could follow in dealing with the war in Iraq. Which ONE do you prefer – [ROTATED: withdraw all troops from Iraq immediately, withdraw all troops by August 2007 -- that is, in 12 months' time, withdraw troops, but take as many years to do this as are needed to turn control over to the Iraqis, (or) send more troops to Iraq]?



Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).

# Chart 25: Believe Bush Has Plan for Iraq

Q. Do you think George W. Bush does, or does not, have a clear plan for handling the situation in Iraq?



^Asked in a rotation with other issues. +WORDING: Do you think the Bush administration does, or does not, have a clear plan for handling the situation in Iraq? Source: Gallup Poll (2007b).



## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
9/16/2001	Cheney	Saddam related to terrorist activities in the past		FR Meet the Press - NBC
11/26/2001	Bush	Iraq may be next target in war on terrorism		FR Rose Garden Press Conference
12/9/2001	Cheney	Advances notion of Iraq-Qaeda connection for first time		FR Meet the Press - NBC
3/17/2002	Cheney	"we know" Iraq has biological and chemical weapons		W1 Cheney Press Conference
3/19/2002	Cheney	"we know they have chemical weapons"		W2 Cheney Press Conference
3/19/2002	Cheney	"we know they are pursuing nuclear weapons"		W3 Cheney Press Conference
3/21/2002	Cheney	pursuing nuclear weapons		W4 Photo Opportunity Speech
3/24/2002	Cheney	actively pursuing nuclear weapons		W5 Late Edition - CNN
3/24/2002	Cheney	has chemical weapons		W6 Late Edition - CNN
3/24/2002	Cheney	pursuing nuclear weapons		W7 Late Edition - CNN
3/24/2002	Cheney	has an inventory of biological and chemical weapons		W8 Face the Nation - CBS
4/3/2002	Powell	developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons		W9 60 Minutes II - CBS
5/19/2002	Cheney	working on nuclear weapons		FR/W10 Meet the Press - NBC
5/19/2002	Cheney	"we know he's got" chemical and biological weapons		W11 Meet the Press - NBC
5/22/2002	Rumsfeld	Iraq has "a very aggressive program to develop nuclear weapons"		W12 News Hour - PBS
6/6/2002	Cheney	Saddam "clearly pursuing these [nuclear] deadly capabilities"		W13 Speech to National Academy of Homebuilders
6/10/2002	Rumsfeld	"we know" they have weaponized chemical weapons		W14 Media Event at Kuwait International Airport
6/13/2002	Powell	Iraq "using wealth to develop chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons"		W15 CTV News Interview
7/19/2002	Cheney	Saddam is a dictator pursuing weapons of mass destruction		W16 Remarks at event for Saxby Chambliss
8/7/2002	Cheney	Saddam continues to pursue and nuclear weapon		W17 Speech to Commonwealth Club of California
8/26/2002	Cheney	Saddam has resumed efforts to acquire nuclear weapons		W20 Speech to VFW 103rd National Convention
8/26/2002	Cheney	"no doubt" that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction		2 Speech to VFW 103rd National Convention
8/26/2002	Cheney	"no doubt" that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction		34 Speech to VFW 103rd National Convention
8/26/2002	Cheney	"no doubt" that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction		W18 Speech to VFW 103rd National Convention
8/26/2002	Cheney	argues for preemptive action against Saddam		W19 Speech to VFW 103rd National Convention
8/29/2002	Cheney	convinced Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons "fairly soon"		W21 VP Honors Veterans of Korean War
8/29/2002	Cheney	Saddam continues to pursue aggressive nuclear program		W22 VP Honors Veterans of Korean War
9/4/2002	Lieberman	every day Saddam in power with chemical, biological, and development of nuclear weapons is "day of danger" to US		1 ???
9/7/2002	Card	explains WH strategy on preemptive war with Iraq		FR New York Times
9/8/2002	Cheney	Saddam has reconstituted his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon		W24 Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Cheney	Saddam has engineers, design, and now possibly fissile material for nuclear program		FR Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Cheney	Saddam trying to acquire equipment to enrich uranium to make bombs		W25 Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Cheney	Saddam has been seeking to acquire tubes to build centrifuge		W35 Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Cheney	Saddam "actively and aggressively" seeking to acquire nuclear weapons		W34 Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Rice	Saddam has infrastructure and scientists to make a weapon"		W36 Late Edition - CNN
9/8/2002	Rice	Saddam actively pursuing a nuclear weapon		W37 Late Edition - CNN
9/8/2002	Rice	Saddam receiving tubes "really only suited" for nuclear weapons program		W38 Late Edition - CNN
9/8/2002	Rice	"There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons"		W39 Late Edition - CNN
9/8/2002	Rumsfeld	The only way to know for certain whether Saddam has nuclear weapons is if he uses one		W30 Face the Nation - CBS
9/8/2002	Powell	Saddam has chemical and biological weapons and has used them before		W23 FOX News Sunday
9/8/2002	Powell	"no doubt" Saddam has chemical weapons stocks		W26 FOX News Sunday
9/8/2002	Powell	Saddam working hard to develop means to disseminate weapons		W27 FOX News Sunday
9/8/2002	Powell	"no doubt" he still has chemical weapons stocks and capacity to produce more		W29 FOX News Sunday
9/8/2002	Powell	confident Saddam continues to pursue technology to develop nuclear weapons		W28 FOX News Sunday
9/8/2002	Cheney	Saddam more dangerous than North Korea and actively working on nuclear weapons program		W31 Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Cheney	no allegation that Iraq was responsible for 9/11, but there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda over the years		W32 Meet the Press - NBC
9/8/2002	Cheney	know "with absolute certainty" Saddam is trying to acquire equipment to enrich uranium and build a nuclear weapon		W33 Meet the Press - NBC
9/12/2002	Bush	Iraq expanding and improving facilities for producing biological weapons		4 Speech to UN General Assembly
9/12/2002	Bush	Iraq made several attempts to buy aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon		W40 Speech to UN General Assembly
9/12/2002	Bush	Saddam's regime is a "grave and gathering danger"		W41 Speech to UN General Assembly
9/12/2002	Bush	suggests Saddam's "emboldened regime" might supply weapons to terrorist allies		W42 Speech to UN General Assembly
9/12/2002	Bush	first time completely certain he has nuclear weapon is when he uses one		W43 Speech to UN General Assembly
9/12/2002	Bush	if Iraq gets fissile material, can build nuclear weapon in a year		W44 Speech to UN General Assembly
9/14/2002	Bush	Saddam has sought to purchase equipment to enrich uranium and should he acquire fissile material could build nuclear weapon in a year		FR Weekly radio address
9/15/2002	Rice	Saddam's link to terrorism includes a link to Al Qaeda		W45 FOX News Sunday
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	Iraqi regime has "large, clandestine stockpiles" of chemical and biological weapons		35 Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam has stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons		W46 Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	He has biological and chemical weapons		W47 Testimony to House Armed Services Committee

## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	He is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons	W48	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas	W49	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons	W50	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	"We do know" that the regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction	W51	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	"We do know" they are currently pursuing nuclear weapons	W52	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	They "have an enormous appetite for weapons, biological and chemical weapons" and continue to make them today	W53	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	Iraq has relationships with countries on the terrorist list and terrorist networks, including Al Qaeda	W54	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/18/2002	Rumsfeld	Al Qaeda network and Saddam's terrorist state with weapons of mass destruction linked; senior Al Qaeda are in Iraq	W55	Interview with Jim Lehrer - PBS
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	"We do know" that the regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction	W56	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	"We do know" they are currently pursuing nuclear weapons	W57	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam has "stockpiles" of chemical and biological weapons	W58	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam is "aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons"	W59	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam's regime "has an active program to acquire nuclear weapons"	W60	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam has amassed "large, clandestine stockpiles" of chemical and biological weapons	W61	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	Iraq part of the war on terror; "stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war"	W62	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/19/2002	Rumsfeld	"No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein and Iraq"	W63	Testimony to House Armed Services Committee
9/20/2002	Cheney	"Irrefutable evidence" that Saddam has reconstituted program to enrich uranium	FR	Speech at GOP fundraiser in Wyoming
9/26/2002	Bush	Regime is seeking a nuclear bomb and given fissile material could build one in a year	W64	Discussion with Congressional Leaders
9/26/2002	Bush	Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons	W66	Discussion with Congressional Leaders
9/26/2002	Rumsfeld	Suggests ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda; Al Qaeda seeking weapons from Iraq	W65	Defense Department Regular Briefing
9/27/2002	Rumsfeld	Iraq has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas	W67	Speech to Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce
9/27/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam's regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons	W68	Speech to Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce
9/27/2002	Rumsfeld	Repeats the suggestion that "the first time we know they have a nuclear weapon is when they use one"	W69	Speech to Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce
9/28/2002	Bush	Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons	W70	Weekly radio address
9/28/2002	Bush	Iraqi regime has "longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist groups"; "there are Al Qaeda terrorist in Iraq"	W71	Weekly radio address
10/2/2002	Bush	Iraqi regime has scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons, seeking materials	W72	Meeting with House Leadership on Iraq Resolution
10/2/2002	Bush	In defiance of UN, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons	W73	Meeting with House Leadership on Iraq Resolution
10/2/2002	Bush	Iraqi regime is a threat of "unique urgency"...it has "developed weapons of mass death"	W74	Meeting with House Leadership on Iraq Resolution
10/5/2002	Bush	In defiance of UN, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons and is rebuilding facilities to make more	W75	Speech on Danger of Iraqi Regime
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq has purchased tubes and equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon	W79	Televised address from Cincinnati
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons and is seeking nuclear weapons	36/FR	Televised address from Cincinnati
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq and Al Qaeda have contacts going back a decade; Iraq has trained Al Qaeda in bomb making, poisons, and deadly gases	W80	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq has a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for	W76	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	Saddam is moving closer to developing a nuclear weapon	W77	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	After 11 years of US counter-efforts, Saddam still has chemical and biological weapons and the capability to make more	W78	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq has manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse weapons, possibly targeting the U.S.	W81	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq is rebuilding facilities used to produce chemical and biological weapons	W82	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	The Iraqi regime is seeking nuclear weapons	W83	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	America must not ignore the threat...the smoking gun could come in the form of a mushroom cloud	W84	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	If Iraq gets quantity of highly enriched uranium larger than a softball, it could have a nuclear weapon within a year	W85	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/7/2002	Bush	Iraq possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons	W86	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/9/2002	Powell	"We do know" Saddam has stocks of biological and chemical weapons	W87	Larry King Live - CNN
10/14/2002	Bush	There is a connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein	W88	Speech condemning attacks on Bali
10/22/2002	Powell	"They have chemical weapons, they have biological weapons, they're trying to acquire nuclear weapons"	W89	Oprah Winfrey Show - ABC
10/22/2002	Powell	Iraq is trying to acquire nuclear weapons	W90	Oprah Winfrey Show - ABC
10/28/2002	Bush	Saddam has had contacts with Al Qaeda	W91	Bush outlines Iraqi Threat
10/30/2002	Powell	Saddam has weapons of mass destruction and terrorist could get hold of them	W92	Talk Radio News interview
11/3/2002	Bush	Saddam has chemical weapons and has used them against his neighbors	W93	Disarmament Speech from South Dakota
11/3/2002	Bush	Saddam has weapons of mass destruction and would like "nothing more" than to give them to terrorists to do his "dirty work"	W94	Disarmament Speech from South Dakota
11/4/2002	Bush	"He said he wouldn't have chemical weapons; he's got them"	W95	Remarks at Missouri welcome
11/4/2002	Bush	We know he's got chemical weapons, and he's used them	W96	Remarks in Iowa
11/4/2002	Bush	Saddam has connections with Al Qaeda; Iraq serves as a terrorist "arsenal" and "training ground"	W97	Remarks at Texas welcome
11/4/2002	Bush	Saddam has chemical weapons and has used them	W98	Remarks at Texas welcome
11/4/2002	Bush	Saddam has connections with Al Qaeda; Iraq serves as a terrorist "arsenal" and "training ground"	W99	Remarks at Missouri welcome
11/4/2002	Bush	"He said he wouldn't have chemical weapons; he's got them"	W100	Remarks at Arkansas welcome
11/4/2002	Bush	Saddam has connections with Al Qaeda; Iraq serves as a terrorist "arsenal" and "training ground"	W101	Remarks at Arkansas welcome
11/7/2002	Bush	Saddam is dealing with Al Qaeda; an "Al Qaeda-type network trained by Saddam could attack America and leave not one fingerprint"	W102	Speech outlining priorities
11/10/2002	Powell	Saddam doing everything to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction--bio, chem, nuclear and will not hesitate to provide them to terrorists	W103	Washington Post Op-Ed

## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
11/14/2002	Rumsfeld	Saddam has an active program to develop nuclear weapons	W104	Interview on Infinity CBS Radio
11/14/2002	Rumsfeld	Suggests Saddam could transfer a WMD to terrorists and cause the death of thousands in as little as a week or month	W105	Interview on Infinity CBS Radio
11/14/2002	Rumsfeld	"We know" Saddam has chemical and biological weapons	W106	Interview on Infinity CBS Radio
11/14/2002	Rumsfeld	Ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda for 8-10 years; currently Al Qaeda in Iraq	W107	Interview on Infinity CBS Radio
11/20/2002	Bush	Saddam has used WMD against his own people and must not be allowed to produce or possess these weapons	W108	Speech to Atlantic Youth Council - CNN
12/2/2002	Fleischer	"If he declares he has none, then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again misleading the world"	5	???
12/2/2002	Cheney	Regime has had "high-level" contacts with Al Qaeda for a decade and has provided training to Al Qaeda	W109	Speech at Air National Guard Leadership Conf
12/2/2002	Cheney	Al Qaeda may join with "outlaw regimes" to attack their "common enemy," the United States	W110	Speech at Air National Guard Leadership Conf
12/3/2002	Rumsfeld	Iraq has an active nuclear weapons program	W111	Department of Defense News Briefing
12/19/2002	Powell	Iraq has failed to account for African uranium - Niger specified; has tried to acquire aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment	W112	Press Conference on Iraq Declaration
12/24/2002	PM of Niger	Prime Minister of Niger declares Iraq has not purchased or inquired about purchasing uranium since he took office in 2000	FR	???
1/7/2003	Rumsfeld	Based on contemporary intelligence, "no doubt in my mind that they currently have chemical and biological weapons"	37	Pentagon news briefing
1/7/2003	Rumsfeld	"The problem with Iraq is chemical or biological weapons today"	W113	Pentagon news briefing
1/9/2003	Fleischer	"We know for a fact that there are weapons there"	6	Press briefing
1/9/2003	Fleischer	"We know for a fact that there are weapons there"	38	Press briefing
1/20/2003	Bush	Iraq report failed to address attempts to acquire and enrich uranium	W114	Open Letter to Cheney / Senate
1/20/2003	Rumsfeld	Iraq poses a threat "to the security of our people and to the stability of the world that is distinct from any other"	W115	Speech to Army Reserve Operators
1/20/2003	Rumsfeld	Saddam's regime is a "grave and gathering danger"... "we cannot ignore"	W116	Speech to Army Reserve Operators
1/20/2003	Rumsfeld	Saddam possesses chemical and biological weapons	W117	Speech to Army Reserve Operators
1/20/2003	Rumsfeld	Saddam has a active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons	W118	Speech to Army Reserve Operators
1/23/2003	Rice	Claims Iraq's declaration fails to account for effort to obtain uranium abroad	W119	New York Times Op-Ed
1/26/2003	Powell	Suggests link between Iraq and Al Qaeda (as well as other terrorist organizations) over the years, but not necessarily a 9/11 link	W120	Interview with European Editors
1/26/2003	Powell	Questions why Iraq is still trying to acquire uranium and the equipment to turn into a nuclear weapon	W121	Remarks at World Economic Forum
1/26/2003	Powell	Insists that the longer we wait to deal with Iraq (who has "clear ties" to terrorist groups), the greater the chance Saddam might share or use weapons	W122	Remarks at World Economic Forum
1/27/2003	Powell	"We see no reason not to believe" that Iraq and Al Qaeda are in contact and "the presence of Al Qaeda elements or individuals in Iraq is a reasonable assumption"	W123	Briefing on Iraq Weapons Inspectors' Report
1/28/2003	Bush	"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa"	W124	State of the Union Address
1/28/2003	Bush	Saddam aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda; he could provide a weapon to terrorists or help them develop one	W125	State of the Union Address
1/28/2003	Bush	Suggested Saddam may help arm terrorists	W126	State of the Union Address
1/28/2003	Bush	Saddam has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes for nuclear weapons production	W127	State of the Union Address
1/28/2003	Bush	Intelligence officials estimate that Saddam had materials to produce "as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent"	7	State of the Union Address
1/29/2003	Rumsfeld	Accuses Iraq of buying things necessary for the development of a nuclear program	W128	Defense Department Regular Briefing
1/29/2003	Rumsfeld	Regime has the design for a nuclear weapon and was working on several methods of enriching uranium	W129	Defense Department Regular Briefing
1/29/2003	Rumsfeld	Regime was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa	W130	Defense Department Regular Briefing
1/29/2003	Rumsfeld	Regime "plays host to terrorists, including Al Qaeda"	W131	Defense Department Regular Briefing
1/29/2003	Powell	Suggests it is a danger for Saddam to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, & nuclear	W132	Interview by RAI Television of Italy
1/29/2003	Powell	"We will put forward additional information that will substantiate the claim that they have programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons	W133	Interview by RAI Television of Italy
1/29/2003	Powell	Suggests links over the years as well as continuing links between Iraq and Al Qaeda	W134	Interview by ITN Television of Great Britain
1/30/2003	Cheney	Saddam's regime aids and protects terrorists and could provide weapons of mass destruction to them	W135	Remarks at 30th Political Action Conference
2/3/2003	Powell	"The president confirmed that Iraq has open channels and ties to terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda"	W136	Wall Street Journal article
2/4/2003	Rumsfeld	Refutes Saddam's claims that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction and no ties to Al Qaeda	W137	Defense Department Regular Briefing
2/5/2003	Powell	"We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and to make more"	8	???
2/5/2003	Clinton, Hillary	Iraq poses a continuing threat to the US...by continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations	9	???
2/5/2003	Powell	Suggested Saddam tried to acquire aluminum tubes for use in enriching uranium	W138	Remarks to UN Security Council
2/5/2003	Powell	Suggested Saddam has enough weapons (by the lowest estimate) to cause mass casualties over 100 square miles of territory	W139	Remarks to UN Security Council
2/5/2003	Powell	Argued that there were "sure signs" that several Iraqi bunkers were storing chemical weapons	W140	Remarks to UN Security Council
2/5/2003	Powell	Suggested Iraq is working to develop unmanned aerial vehicles to dispense chemical and biological weapons	W142	Remarks to UN Security Council
2/5/2003	Powell	"Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons"	W143	Remarks to UN Security Council
2/5/2003	Powell	Suggested a "sinister nexus" between Iraq and Al Qaeda; Iraq harbors a terrorist network headed by al-Zarqawi; Al Qaeda might turn to Iraq to help acquire weapons	W144	Remarks to UN Security Council
2/5/2003	Rice	"No question" about Al Qaeda connection; suggested Saddam became more involved with Al Qaeda after 1998 embassy bombings and gave them assistance with chemical and biological weapons; now harbors a terrorist network under Zarqawi	W141	Larry King Live - CNN
2/6/2003	Bush	Saddam has "longstanding, direct, and continuing ties" to terrorist networks; have met 8 times since 1990s, Iraq sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with Al Qaeda, supplied weapons training, and harbors a terrorist network	W145	"World Can Rise To This Moment" Speech
2/6/2003	Bush	United States will disarm the Iraqi regime and "not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons"	W146	"World Can Rise To This Moment" Speech
2/6/2003	Bush	Iraq has unmanned aerial vehicles that are meant for dispersing chemical and biological weapons	W147	"World Can Rise To This Moment" Speech

## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
2/8/2003	Bush	"Sources tell us Saddam recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons, the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have"	10	???
2/8/2003	Bush	"Sources tell us Saddam recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons, the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have"	39	???
2/8/2003	Bush	Suggested Saddam has "longstanding, direct, and continuing ties to Al Qaeda"	W148	President's Radio Address
2/16/2003	Rice	Described a "poisons network with at least two dozen operatives in Baghdad" receiving weapons training	W149	FOX News Sunday
2/25/2003	Rumsfeld	Iraq has a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to dispense weapons	W150	Remarks at Hoover Institute Meeting
2/25/2003	Bush	Calls Saddam a "madman with weapons of mass destruction"	W151	Meeting with National Economic Council
3/6/2003	Bush	Saddam "has trained and financed Al Qaeda-type organizations before"	W152	National Press Conference
3/7/2003	Blix	Hans Blix asks for more time in weapons inspections; has found "no evidence" of mobile biological production facilities	FR	???
3/7/2003	ElBaradei	IAEA director reports that Niger documents are "not authentic"	FR	???
3/8/2003	Wilson, Joseph	Former ambassador discusses forgeries, suggesting the administration "fess up" and turn to other evidence of Saddam's involvement in the nuclear trade	FR	CNN
3/9/2003	Powell	Disputes Tom Friedman's claim that there is no connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda, insisting that there is evidence of connections to Al Qaeda	W153	Meet the Press - NBC
3/9/2003	Rice	Suggested Saddam might transfer a weapon to terrorists	W154	Face the Nation - CBS
3/9/2003	Rice	Claims the head of training for Al Qaeda said the organization sought and received help in weapons training from Iraq	FR	Face the Nation - CBS
3/11/2003	Rumsfeld	Refutes Saddam's claims that Iraq has no chemical or biological weapons, suggesting that he moves them "as often as every 12 to 24 hours" and "places them in residential neighborhoods"	W155	Department of Defense Briefing
3/16/2003	Cheney	"We believe [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons"	40	Meet the Press - NBC
3/16/2003	Cheney	"We know he's out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons"	W156	Meet the Press - NBC
3/16/2003	Cheney	"We know [Saddam] has, in fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons"... "and has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda organization"	W157	Meet the Press - NBC
3/16/2003	Cheney	"We believe [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons"	W158	Meet the Press - NBC
3/16/2003	Cheney	Cited the most important rationale for going to war in Iraq as "his development and use of chemical weapons, his development of biological weapons, and his pursuit of nuclear weapons"	W159	Meet the Press - NBC
3/16/2003	Cheney	Suggested a "devastating attack" if a terrorist organization "gets married up with a rogue state that's willing to provide it with the kinds of deadly capabilities that Saddam has developed and used over the years"	W160	Meet the Press - NBC
3/17/2003	Bush	"The regime has aided, trained, and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al Qaeda"; suggests terrorists might obtain weapons from Iraq that could kill "thousands or hundreds of thousands of people"	W161	President Says Saddam Must Leave Within 48 Hrs
3/17/2003	Bush	"Intelligence...leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised"	41	???
3/18/2003	Bush	"Intelligence...leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised"	12	???
3/18/2003	Blair	Says that Saddam's claim that he destroyed weapons is "palpably absurd"	17	???
3/20/2003	Rumsfeld	Suggested that each day Saddam "advances his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and could pass them along to terrorists" and could kill 30,000 or 300,000 people	W162	Remarks to American Troops
3/21/2003	Fleischer	"There is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly"	14	???
3/22/2003	Franks	"There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction"	15	???
3/22/2003	Clark	"One of our top objectives is to find and destroy the WMD. There are a number of sites"	17	???
3/23/2003	Adelman	"I have no doubt we're going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction"	16	???
3/23/2003	Rumsfeld	"We have seen intelligence...over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and they have dispersed them and they're weaponized"	W163	Discusses War - CBS
3/25/2003	Powell	"We know they have chemical weapons"	W164	Interview with Juan Williams - NPR
3/30/2003	Rumsfeld	"We know where [the weapons of mass destruction] are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad"	W165	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
3/30/2003	Rumsfeld	"We know where [the weapons of mass destruction] are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad"	42	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
3/30/2003	Rumsfeld	"We know where [the weapons of mass destruction] are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad"	18	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
4/2/2003	Straw	"Saddam's removal is necessary to eradicate the threat from his weapons of mass destruction"	19	???
4/9/2003	Kagan	"Obviously the administration intends to publicize all the weapons of mass destruction US forces find - and there will be plenty"	20	???
4/10/2003	Fleischer	Bush officials have "a measure of high confidence that, indeed, the weapons of mass destruction will be found"	21	???
4/24/2003	Bush	Regarding WMD: "...perhaps he destroyed some, perhaps he dispersed some. And so we will find them."	22	???
4/28/2003	Blair	"Before people crow about the absence of weapons of mass destruction, I suggest they wait a bit"	23	???
5/1/2003	Bush	Mentioned 9/11 several times in his speech about Iraq, implying a connection	W166	Major Combat Operations Have Ended
5/1/2003	Bush	Regarding Iraq: "We've removed an ally of Al Qaeda and cut off source of terrorist funding"	W167	Major Combat Operations Have Ended
5/3/2003	Bush	"There are people who in large measure have information that we need...so that we can track down the weapons of mass destruction in that country"	24	???
5/4/2003	Powell	"I am confident that we will find evidence that makes it clear he had weapons of mass destruction"	25	???
5/4/2003	Rumsfeld	"I never believed that we'd just tumble over weapons of mass destruction in that country"	26	???
5/6/2003	Bush	"I'm not surprised if we begin to uncover the weapons program of Saddam Hussein--because he had a weapons program"	27	???
5/12/2003	Rice	"US officials never expected that we were going to open garages and find weapons of mass destruction"	28	???
5/13/2003	Petraeus	"I just don't know whether it was all destroyed years ago...whether they were destroyed right before the war, or whether they're still hidden"	29	???
5/16/2003	Powell	Said he was "quite sure" WMDs would be found; said evidence suggests that equipment and mobile vans found were used for weapons production	W168	Interview with ZDF Morgenmagazin
5/21/2003	Hagee	"Before the war, there's no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical. I expected them to be found. I still expect them to be found."	30	???
5/21/2003	Powell	Suggested that the intelligence community is convinced the vans found were used for weapons production	W169	Remarks with Bahrain's Crown Prince
5/22/2003	Powell	"...it is becoming clear that these vans can have no other purpose that the production of biological weapons"	W170	Press Conference at French American Press Club

## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
5/22/2003	Powell	"...there is no doubt in our minds now that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make biological weapons"	W171	Interview with French Television 1
5/26/2003	Myers	"Given time, given the number of prisoners now that we're interrogating, I'm confident that we're going to find weapons of mass destruction"	31	???
5/27/2003	Rumsfeld	"They may have had time to destroy [the weapons], and I don't know the answer"	32	???
5/27/2003	Rumsfeld	Denies the public was misled about WMDs: "I think the intelligence community provided the best intelligence available and that we will find additional substantiating evidence"	W172	Interview with WNYW-TV
5/28/2003	Wolfowitz	"For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction (as justification for invading Iraq) because it was the one reason everyone could agree on"	33	???
5/28/2003	Rice	"We have found biological weapons laboratories that look precisely like what Secretary Powell described in his report to the United Nations"	W173	Preview of President's Trip To Europe & Middle East
5/29/2003	Rumsfeld	"My personal view is we're going to find them, just as we found these two mobile laboratories"	W174	Town Hall Meeting - CBS Radio
5/29/2003	Rumsfeld	"We believed then, and we believe now, that the Iraqis had a program to develop nuclear weapons, but did not have nuclear weapons. That is what the UK's intelligence suggested as well. We still believe that."	W175	Town Hall Meeting - CBS Radio
5/29/2003	Rumsfeld	Suggested that laboratory workers revealed the purpose of the mobile trailers	W176	Town Hall Meeting - CBS Radio
5/29/2003	Rumsfeld	Addressed the question of "why haven't we found anything?" by citing the mobile laboratories that match Powell's UN description	W177	Town Hall Meeting - CBS Radio
5/29/2003	Bush	"We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories...for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong, we found them"	W178	Interview on Polish Television
5/29/2003	Graham	Senator Bob Graham challenges the White House on prewar intelligence, citing a "Nixon-like stench to the continued practice of putting the American people in the dark"	FR	???
5/30/2003	Powell	Expressed confidence that the vans found were used for weapons production	W179	Press Gaggle
5/30/2003	Powell	Suggested that the mobile biological weapons facilities found "make it clear that there is such a capability that's existed over the years"	W180	Press Gaggle
6/1/2003	Bush	"We've discovered a weapons system, biological labs, that Iraq denied she had, and labs that were prohibited under the UN resolutions"	W181	Signing of Treaty of Moscow
6/2/2003	Powell	Regarding his speech to the UN: "I showed drawings of a biological laboratory. We found that biological laboratory, now everybody can see it"	W182	Interview on Italian TV Canale 5
6/2/2003	Powell	"Now we found some mobile labs, we're interviewing people, we have a lot of documents that have come into our possession and we'll be examining that"	W183	Interview on World News Tonight - ABC
6/3/2003	Rice	Responding to challenges regarding trailers: "We know that these trailers look exactly like what was described to us by multiple sources as the capabilities for building or making biological agents"	W184	Capital Report - CNBC
6/3/2003	Rice	"Secretary Powell talked about a mobile, biological weapons capability. That has now been found...So we are finding these pieces that were described"	W185	Capital Report - CNBC
6/5/2003	???	CIA analysts said they felt pressured by Cheney and Scooter Libby who made multiple trips to the agency to inquire about WMD's and Iraq's ties to Al Qaeda before the war	FR	The Washington Post
6/5/2003	Bush	Downgrades rhetoric in Qatar: "We recently found to mobile biological weapons facilities which were capable of producing biological agents"	FR	???
6/8/2003	Bush	Downgrades rhetoric in Qatar: "We recently found to mobile biological weapons facilities which were capable of producing biological agents"	W186	Speech to Troops in Qatar
6/8/2003	Rice	"Already, we've discovered, uh, uh, trailers, uh, that look remarkably similar to what Colin Powell described in his Feb 5th speech, biological weapons production facilities"	W188	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
6/8/2003	Rice	In response to how the claim that Saddam sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa made it into the President's State of the Union address, Rice said, "The intelligence community did not know at the time or at levels that got to us that there was serious questions about this report"	W189	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
6/8/2003	Rice	"At the time that the State of the Union address was prepared, there were also other sources that said that they were, the Iraqis were seeking yellow cake, uranium oxide from Africa"	W190	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
6/8/2003	Rice	"And there were other attempts to, to get yellow cake from Africa"	W191	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
6/8/2003	Rice	Regarding find weapons of mass destruction: "We are confident that we--I believe that we will find them. I think that we have already found important clues like the biological weapons laboratories that look surprisingly like what Colin Powell described in his speech."	W187	Meet the Press - NBC
6/8/2003	Rice	Regarding the fabrication of Iraq's nuclear weapons program: "We did not know at the time--no one knew at the time, in our circles--maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery"	W192	Meet the Press - NBC
6/8/2003	Powell	"And I think the mobile labs are what I think is a good indication of the kind of thing they are doing"	W193	Remarks at Stakeout Following FOX News Interview
6/8/2003	Powell	"We have uncovered the mobile vans and we are continuing to search"	W194	Remarks at Stakeout Following FOX News Interview
6/8/2003	Powell	"And I would put before you Exhibit A, the mobile biological labs that we have found"	W195	FOX News Sunday
6/8/2003	Powell	Suggested that Iraq would have offered open access to the vans after the UN address if the vans were not being used for illicit purposes	W196	Late Edition - CNN
6/8/2003	Powell	Championed the fact that all he showed the UN was a cartoon drawing of the vans, but they actually turned up later	W197	Late Edition - CNN
6/12/2003	Powell	Noted that no biological weapons were found with the labs, but the labs "could produce biological weapons whenever Saddam Hussein might have wanted a biological weapons inventory"	W198	Interview by the Associated Press
6/12/2003	Powell	"I think that we will be able to demonstrate convincingly through the mobile labs, through documentation, through interviews, through what we find, that we knew what we were talking about"	W199	Interview by the Associated Press
6/23/2003	Powell	Again offered the mobile biological laboratories as evidence of Iraq's weapons programs	W200	Interview on Al Arabiyya Television
6/27/2003	Powell	"The imminent threat is that suddenly, this biological warfare lab, for example, could have been put to use"	W201	Interview on NPR's All Things Considered
6/30/2003	Powell	"We have found the mobile biological weapons labs that I could only show cartoons of that day"	W202	Interview on the Today Show - NBC
7/2/2003	Powell	Championed the fact that all he showed the UN was a cartoon drawing of the vans, but they actually turned up later	W203	Interview with Sean Hannity - ABC Radio
7/10/2003	Powell	Championed the fact that all he showed the UN was a cartoon drawing of the vans, but they actually turned up later; offered as "a pretty good indication that we were not cooking the books"	W204	Press Briefing at the State Department
7/11/2003	Rice	Claims the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her or other senior Administration officials	W205	Press Gaggle with Fleischer and Rice

## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
7/11/2003	Rice	Claims the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her or other senior Administration officials	W206	Press Gaggle with Fleischer and Rice
7/11/2003	Rice	"...knowing what we now know, that some of the Niger documents were apparently forged, we wouldn't have put this in the President's speech - but that's knowing what we know now."	W207	Press Gaggle with Fleischer and Rice
7/11/2003	Rice	Claims the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her or other senior Administration officials	W208	Press Gaggle with Fleischer and Rice
7/12/2003	Fleischer	"The President sees this as much ado, that it's beside the point of the central threat that Saddam Hussein presented...Yes, the President has moved on. And I think, frankly, much of the country has moved on, as well."		FR Daily Briefing
7/13/2003	Rumsfeld	"We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate."	W209	This Week with George Stephanopolous - ABC
7/13/2003	Rice	"In retrospect, knowing that some of the documents underneath may have been--were, indeed, forgeries, and knowing that apparently there were concerns swirling around about this, had we known that at the time, we would not have put it in. . . . And had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone."	W210	Face the Nation - CBS
7/13/2003	Rumsfeld	"It turns out it's technically correct what the president said, that the UK does--did say that--and still says that. They haven't changed their mind, the UK intelligence people"		FR Meet the Press - NBC
7/17/2003	Bush	"I strongly believe he was trying to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program"	W211	Bush & Blair discuss war on terrorism
7/21/2003	Wolfowitz	"I'm not concerned about weapons of mass destruction. I'm not saying that getting to the bottom of this WMD issue isn't important. It is important. But it is not of immediate consequence."		FR On visit to Iraq
7/30/2003	Rice	Suggested Saddam had an "active procurement network" to obtain aluminum tubes for nuclear purposes	W212	News Hour - PBS
7/31/2003	Rice	"Going into the war against Iraq, we had very strong intelligence. I've been in this business for 20 years. And some of the strongest intelligence cases that I've seen, key judgments by our intelligence community that Saddam Hussein could have a nuclear weapons by the end of the decade, if left unchecked . . . that he was trying to reconstitute his nuclear program."	W213	Interview with ZDF German Television
9/7/2003	Rice	Responding to a question about the link between Saddam & Al Qaeda: "Absolutely. . . . But we know that there was training of al Qaeda in chemical and perhaps biological warfare. We know that the Zarqawi was network out of there, this poisons network that was trying to spread poisons throughout . . . . And there was an Ansar al-Islam, which appears also to try to be operating in Iraq. So yes, the al Qaeda link was there."	W215	FOX News Sunday
9/14/2003	Cheney	"With respect to 9/11, of course, we've had the story that's been public out there. The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we've never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don't know."	W216	Meet the Press - NBC
9/14/2003	Cheney	"[Since September 11] We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s, that it involved training, for example, on BW and CW, that al-Qaeda sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems that are involved. The Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the al-Qaeda organization."	W217	Meet the Press - NBC
9/14/2003	Cheney	"Same on biological weapons--we believe he'd developed the capacity to go mobile with his BW production capability because, again, in reaction to what we had done to him in '91. We had intelligence reporting before the war that there were at least seven of these mobile labs that he had gone out and acquired. We've, since the war, found two of them. They're in our possession today, mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted to use during the course of developing the capacity for an attack."	W218	Meet the Press - NBC
9/14/2003	Cheney	"If we're successful in Iraq, if we can stand up a good representative government in Iraq, that secures the region so that it never again becomes a threat to its neighbors or to the United States, so it's not pursuing weapons of mass destruction, so that it's not a safe haven for terrorists, now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11."	W219	Meet the Press - NBC
9/22/2003	Bush	Explaining what happened to Saddam's WMDs: "I think he hid them, I think he dispersed them. I think he is so adapted at deceiving the civilized world for a long period of time that it's going to take a while for the troops to unravel. But I firmly believe he had weapons of mass destruction. I know he used them at one time, and I'm confident he had programs to enable him to have a weapon of mass destruction at his disposal."		FR Interview with Brit Hume
9/28/2003	Rice	"Saddam Hussein -- no one has said that there is evidence that Saddam Hussein directed or controlled 9/11, but let's be very clear, he had ties to al-Qaeda, he had al-Qaeda operatives who had operated out of Baghdad."	W220	Meet the Press - NBC
9/28/2003	Rice	"On nuclear there was dissent on the extent of the program and how far along the program might be. How much had he gone to reconstitute? But the judgment of the intelligence community was that he had kept in place his infrastructure, that he was trying to procure items. For instance, there's been a lot of talk about the aluminum tubes but they were prohibited on the list of the nuclear suppliers group for a reason."	W221	Meet the Press - NBC
10/2/2003	Kay, David	"We have found substantial evidence of an intent of senior-level Iraqi officials, including Saddam, to continue production at some future point in time of weapons of mass destruction. We have not found at this point actual weapons. It does not mean we've concluded there are no actual weapons. It means at this point in time, and it's a huge country with a lot to do, that we have not yet found weapons."		FR ???
10/3/2003	Cheney	"And the reason we had to do Iraq, if you hark back and think about that link between the terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, Iraq was the place where we were most fearful that that was most likely to occur, because in Iraq we've had a government -- not only was it one of the worst dictatorships in modern times, but had oftentimes hosted terrorists in the past . . . but also an established relationship with the al Qaeda organization . . . ."	W222	Remarks at Luncheon for Congressman Jim Gerlach
10/3/2003	Cheney	"It isn't a figment of anyone's imagination that just 15 years ago they gassed and killed 5,000 people with sarin and VX at a place called Halabja I visited just a few weeks ago. They never lost that capability."	W223	Meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister
10/3/2003	Cheney	"Al Qaeda had a base of operation there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran a large poisons factory for attacks against Europeans and U.S. forces."	W224	Remarks at Bush-Cheney 2004 Fundraiser
10/3/2003	Cheney	"If we had had that information and ignored it, if we'd been told, as we were, by the intelligence community that he was capable of producing a nuclear weapon within a year if he could acquire fissile material and ignored it . . . we would have been derelict in our duties and responsibilities."	W225	Remarks at Luncheon for Congressman Jim Gerlach

## Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials

Date	Person	Assertion	Code	Source
10/3/2003	Cheney	"If we had not paid any attention to the fact that al Qaeda was being hosted in Northeastern Iraq, part of poisons network producing ricin and cyanide that was intended to be used in attacks both in Europe, as well as in North Africa and ignored it, we would have been derelict in our duties and responsibilities."	W226	Remarks at Luncheon for Congressman Jim Gerlach
10/5/2003	Cheney	"Al Qaeda had a base of operation there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran a large poisons factory for attacks against Europeans and U.S. forces."	W227	Remarks at Bush-Cheney 2004 Fundraiser
10/10/2003	Cheney	"He cultivated ties to terror, hosting the Abu Nidal organization, supporting terrorists, making payments to the families of suicide bombers in Israel. He also had an established relationship with al Qaeda, providing training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons, gases, making conventional bombs."	W228	Remarks at Heritage Foundation
10/18/2003	Cheney	"Saddam Hussein had a lengthy history of reckless and sudden aggression. He cultivated ties to terror -- hosting the Abu Nidal organization, supporting terrorists, and making payments to the families of suicide bombers. He also had an established relationship with Al Qaeda -- providing training to Al Qaeda members in areas of poisons, gases and conventional bombs. He built, possessed, and used weapons of mass destruction."	W229	Remarks at James Baker, Institute for Public Policy
11/2/2003	Bush	"Some of these killers behind these attacks are loyalists of the Saddam regime who seek to regain power and who resent Iraq's new freedoms. Others are foreigners who have traveled to Iraq to spread fear and chaos, and prevent the emergence of a successful democracy in the heart of the Middle East"	FR	Weekly radio address
11/2/2003	Rumsfeld	"We said from the outset that there are several terrorist networks that have global reach and that there were several countries that were harboring terrorists that have global reach. We weren't going into Iraq when we were hit on September 11. And the question is: Well, what do you do about that? If you know there are terrorists and you know there's terrorist states -- Iraq's been a terrorist state for decades -- and you know there are countries harboring terrorists, we believe, correctly, I think, that the only way to deal with it is -- you can't just hunker down and hope they won't hit you again. You simply have to take the battle to them. And we have been consistently working on the Al Qaeda network. We've captured a large number of those folks -- captured or killed -- just as we've now captured or killed a large number of the top 55 Saddam Hussein loyalists."	W230	Meet the Press - NBC
1/9/2004	Cheney	"We did have reporting that was public, that came out shortly after the 9/11 attack, provided by the Czech government, suggesting there had been a meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, and a man named al-Ani (Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani), who was an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague, at the embassy there, in April of '01, prior to the 9/11 attacks. It has never been -- we've never been able to collect any more information on that. That was the one that possibly tied the two together to 9/11."	W231	Interview with Rocky Mountain News
1/9/2004	Cheney	"QUESTION: When I was in Iraq, some of the soldiers said they believed they were fighting because of the Sept. 11 attacks and because they thought Saddam Hussein had ties to al Qaida. You've repeatedly cited such links. . . . I wanted to ask you what you'd say to those soldiers, and were those soldiers misled at all? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: . . . . With respect to . . . the general relationship. . . . One place you ought to go look is an article that Stephen Hayes did in the Weekly Standard . . . That goes through and lays out in some detail, based on an assessment that was done by the Department of Defense and forwarded to the Senate Intelligence Committee some weeks ago. That's your best source of information. I can give you a few quick for instances, one the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. QUESTION: Yes, sir. . . . VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: The main perpetrator was a man named Ramzi Yousef. He's now in prison in Colorado. His sidekick in the exercise was a man named Abdul Rahman Yasin. . . Ahman Rahman . . . Yasin is his last name anyway. I can't remember his earlier first names. He fled the United	W232	Interview with Rocky Mountain News
1/9/2004	Cheney	"[The reporting that we had prior to the war this time around was all consistent with that -- basically said that he had a chemical, biological and nuclear program, and estimated that if he could acquire fissile material, he could have a nuclear weapon within a year or two."	W233	Interview with Rocky Mountain News
1/14/2004	Cheney	"Saddam Hussein had a lengthy history of reckless and sudden aggression. His regime cultivated ties to terror, including the al Qaeda network, and had built, possessed, and used weapons of mass destruction."	W234	Remarks to Los Angeles World Affairs Council
1/15/2004	Cheney	"Saddam Hussein had a lengthy history of reckless and sudden aggression. His regime cultivated ties to terror, including the al Qaeda network, and had built, possessed, and used weapons of mass destruction."	W235	Remarks to Veterans at Arizona Wing Museum
1/20/2004	Bush	Bush downgrades he rhetoric on WMD's after David Kay fails to find Saddam's stockpiles: "Already the Kay report identified dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations. Had we failed to act, the dictator's weapons of mass destruction programs would continue to this day. Had we failed to act, Security Council resolutions on Iraq would have been revealed as empty threats, weakening the United Nations and encouraging defiance by dictators around the world. Iraq's torture chambers would still be filled with victims, terrified and innocent. The killing fields of Iraq, where hundreds of thousands of men and women and children vanished into the sands, would still be known only to the killers. For all who love freedom and peace, the world without Saddam Hussein's regime is a better and safer place."	FR	State of the Union Address
1/22/2004	Cheney	"I continue to believe. I think there's overwhelming evidence that there was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government. We've discovered since documents indicating that a guy named Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was a part of the team that attacked the World Trade Center in '93, when he arrived back in Iraq was put on the payroll and provided a house, safe harbor and sanctuary. That's public information now. So Saddam Hussein had an established track record of providing safe harbor and sanctuary for terrorists. . . . I mean, this is a guy who was an advocate and a supporter of terrorism whenever it suited his purpose, and I'm very confident that there was an established relationship there."	W236	Morning Edition - NPR
1/22/2004	Cheney	"In terms of the question what is there now, we know for example that prior to our going in that he had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological weapons labs, and we're quite confident he did, in fact, have such a program. We've found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we believe were, in fact, part of that program."	W237	Morning Edition - NPR
1/23/2004	Kay/McClellan	David Kay resigns after concluding Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. Scott McClellan holds out hope: "Yes, we believe he had them, and yes, we believe they will be found. We believe the truth will come out."	FR	
6/16/2004	9/11 Commission	The 9/11 Commission concludes that the Atta-Ani meeting in Prague never took place.	FR	9/11 Commission
7/10/2004	Senate Intelligence	The Senate Intelligence Committee report on prewar intelligence finds much of it unfounded and leaves reporting on African uranium inconclusive, stating that the CIA has "not published an assessment to clarify or correct its position on whether or not Iraq was trying to purchase uranium from Africa." The report blames the CIA for incompetence and failing to inform the White House of its misgivings, and further marginalizes State Department dissent on the intelligence. Plans for a phase two, investigating charges that the administration politicized prewar intelligence, are shelved until after the election.	FR	Senate Intelligence Committee report
7/14/2004	Bush admin	After faulting the CIA for its incompetence and overly cautious assessments of intelligence, the Bush administration embraces the findings of a British intelligence review, which says that "Britain had credible evidence that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger, but inconclusive evidence that Iraq had actually purchased it. The evidence was established independent of documents, subsequently shown to be forgeries, that Iraq had procured uranium from Niger."	FR	???

## **Appendix: Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Person</b>	<b>Assertion</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Source</b>
3/2/2006	Tenent/Bush	National Journal reports that on October 1, 2002, CIA director George Tenent handed a one-page digest of the National Intelligence Estimate to President Bush, who read it in Tenent's presence. The summary outlined intelligence community doubts that Iraq's aluminum tubes were intended for WMDs. The National Journal story quotes a "senior official" who describes the President's summary of the NIE as the "one document which illustrates what the president knew and when he knew it," and notes that the administration has refused to either declassify or to provide copies of the NIE document to congressional committees.	FR	National Journal

### **Public Misstatements on Iraq by Senior White House Officials – Code List**

FR – Frank Rich Timeline - [http://www.frankrich.com/rich\\_timeline\\_no\\_print\\_final.pdf](http://www.frankrich.com/rich_timeline_no_print_final.pdf)

1-33 – CounterPunch.org. (29 May 2003). Weapons of mass destruction: Who said what when. Available: <http://www.counterpunch.org/wmd05292003.html>

34-42 – World Socialist Web Site. (21 June 2003). Weapons of mass destruction in Iraq: Bush's 'big lie' and the crisis of American imperialism. Available:

W\*\*\* - Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq. (16 March 2004). (Searchable database of public misstatements on Iraq, prepared for Representative